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This article examines the institutional determinants of party policy change in advanced 
democracies. Party behavior is understood in terms of vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking. 
Party behavioral theory proposes diverse institutional factors that determine what the party seeks 
under certain circumstances. This article evaluates empirical validity of the theoretical arguments by 
examining the factors affecting party policy change dependent on the Comparative Manifestos Project 
data set. This study confirms that the frequent formation of minority or coalition government, 
legislative structure, and party discipline affect party policy change because these institutions affect the 
degree of uncertainty in the conversion of votes into policy and office benefits.  
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1. INTRODUCTION AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This study examines diverse hypotheses of institutional determinants of party policy 
change in advanced democracies. A party is assumed to seek vote, office, or policy (Budge 
and Laver 1986; Strom 1990). “Vote-seeking” theories of party behavior assume that party 
policy formation is not ideologically bound and it is easily amended whenever it is necessary 
to earn more votes. This assumption is completely different from the “policy-seeking 
assumption” of party behavior that a party pursues cohesive and rigid party policy goals in a 
consistent manner in spite of electoral losses, which is not rare in real politics. Downs’ 
(1957) “moving toward center” proposition clearly demonstrates the theoretical fruitfulness 
of the vote-seeking assumption. On the other hand, Riker’s (1962) “minimum wining 
coalition” and Katz and Mair’s (1995) “cartel party” thesis shed light on the office-seeking 
behavior of a party. Each of the assumptions partly explains party behavior.  
On the other hand, each perspective is vulnerable to empirical criticism. In multiparty 
system, a number of parties maintain a persistent position to refuse to be a “catch-all” party 
that would help to maximize votes (Kirchheimer 1966). The frequent appearance of minority 
governments and the dissolution of coalition governments in the middle of a parliamentary 
term defy the office-seeking party model (Strom 1984). 
Here, Strom (1990) makes an important theoretical contribution to bridge the gap of the 
usefulness of the three party behavior models and their empirical vulnerability.  He revisits a 
theory of competitive parties in view of neo-institutionalism and specifies institutional 
conditions that form competitive party behavior. His comprehensive theoretical discussion of 
party behavior allows us to generate several hypotheses of party behavior associated with 
political institutions surrounding parties. Institutions responsible for reaching the party’s 
goals include the feature of party organization, the number of parties, electoral rules, and the 
characteristics of government decision-making institutions that affect a degree of uncertainty 
in policy making after election.  
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Policy-seeking behavior is encouraged and vote-seeking behavior is discouraged when 
the conversion of votes into policy and office benefits is not clear. When this is the case, 
there is no strong incentive for parties to change party policy for short-term vote 
maximization at the cost of ideological consistency. This article tests whether political 
institutions that make the translation of votes into policy and office benefits uncertain 
discourage party policy change.  
Testing hypotheses of institutional determinants of party policy change becomes feasible 
thanks to the data set developed by the Manifest Research Group (MRG). It has developed a 
comprehensive content analysis of party election manifestos. This data set along with other 
data sets available recently makes it possible to do a multivariate cross-national statistical 
analysis in order to examine institutional determinants of party behavior.
1
    
Parties seek votes to obtain policy and office benefits. To the extent of the uncertainty of 
the conversion of votes into government policy and office, parties adjust their vote-seeking 
efforts.  The first hypothesis is related to the uncertain conversion of votes into office spoils, 
and the issue of the translation of votes into policy benefits is dealt with in the second 
hypothesis.  
The political institution that hinders the smooth conversion of votes into office benefits is 
the frequent appearance of a coalition/minority government. The frequent formation of 
coalition and minority government dampens the incentive to change party policy to 
maximize votes. Frequent coalition governments are clearly associated with the nature of the 
party system. Unlike strong two-party system, multiparty system creates an opportunity for 
small parties that do not enjoy a considerable amount of the vote to enter the government by 
forming coalition. This means that a very limited amount of votes would be enough to 
participate in a coalition government. It discourages a rational party leader from pursuing the 
vote to a maximum level at the expense of ideological consistency which is a relatively 
cheap and effective resource for the mobilization of voters. In countries where coalition 
governments are frequently formed, a marginal gain in votes does not play such a significant 
role in post-election government formation, therefore party leaders have a weak incentive to 
maximize votes even though they desire to run the government. The frequent formation of 
coalition government shows that there is no fierce political competition in terms of winner-
takes-all and zero-sum game. To make matters complicated, bargaining power in government 
formation is not proportionally associated with the number of seats that each party occupies 
(Strom 1990: 583). Instead of maximizing votes, the rational move would be to gain enough 
votes in order to garner sufficient bargaining power for the party. Under these political 
circumstances, the marginal utility of votes diminishes dramatically. 
The more serious distortion in the conversion of votes into government office benefits is 
found in the appearance of minority governments. It is not rare to find minority governments 
in parliamentary systems in Western Europe that have no majority on the floor. Serious 
policy distances hinder the formation of winning coalitions among parties on the left and 
right (Budge and Laver 1986). Not only party ideology, but also government decision-
making institutions are ascribed to the formation of minority governments. Strom (1990) 
                                                          
1 Various studies have utilized the data set to test party-related hypotheses. The relationship between 
party program and government policy outcome receives a significant scholarly attention  (Kligemann, 
Hofferbert, and Budge 1994). Another growing research related with the party program data set is 
party coalition formation (Budge and Laver 1993). A comprehensive examination of the date set 
confirms its validity and reliability (Gabel and Huber 2000).  





argues that a minority government is more likely to be formed when non-governmental 
parties may enjoy other institutional bases to affect government policy. According to Strom, 
the degree of “policy influence differential” that is defined as “the relative policy influence 
advantage of governing over nongoverning” plays a part in the political calculation of 
rational party decision makers (Strom 1990: 42). A well developed committee system, one of 
the indicators to measure the policy influence differential, makes it hard for governing 
parties to ignore the voice of opposition parties. This diminishes the incentive for parties to 
participate in the government where they find parties unfit with their party goals at the cost 
of their reputation and future elections. Governmental institutions that reduce the policy 
disadvantages of non-governing parties over governing parties, along with ideologically 
polarized party systems, contribute to the emergence of a government that enjoys less than 
half of the vote. Here, the vote does not decide a winning coalition. The vote on the choice of 
who governs becomes much less instrumental in a minority government formation than in 
any other form of government in democracies. In a word, the frequent presence of minority 
governments means that the vote is not directly or reliably translated into the formation of a 
government. 
 
Hypothesis 1: In countries governed by coalition or minority governments there is 
less incentive for a party to change its policy as an attempt to make a marginal gain in 
votes.   
 
Conversion of votes into policy benefits after electoral victory depends on control of 
legislative process. Of course, parties that control the executive branch exert greater policy 
influence than opposition parties. But the degree to which incumbents are advantaged 
depends on regime types. Ideally there are two types: the Westminster model and the 
Consensus model (Lijphart 1984). In the Westminster model, “winner-takes-all” politics is 
prevalent, and opposition parties have little policy influence. On the other hand, in the 
consociational democracies, opposition parties and government, more often than not, equally 
share policy making power. Therefore, in Westminster democracies, parties are more 
motivated to govern than in Consensus systems in order to realize their policy goal, and 
parties in the Westminster systems have greater incentives to maximize votes in electoral 
competition and increase their legislative seats.  
The logic of veto player leads us to the same conclusion. As the number of veto players 
as well as policy distance between them increases, the status quo becomes more likely to 
prevail. Any policy proposal should satisfy preferences of veto players to be passed, so a 
feasible set for policy adoption shrinks as the number of veto players increases (Tsebellis 
2002). If the system has a large number of veto players, policy benefits of the incumbent are 
negligible. Consequently, parties have weak incentives to change their party policy to 
maximize their votes and to control the executive branch.  
Bicameralism creates a powerful veto player. The strong bicameralism that we can 
observe in the United States, Australia, and Germany obscures the center of power and 
creates a strong opposition party (Lijphart 1984). Legislative gridlock in the U.S is often 
ascribed to the Senate, whose ideal policy point is different from the one in the Congress and 
presidency (Brady and Volden 1998).  
Another factor that gives a significant legislative power to parties that do not control the 
executive branch is well-developed committee systems in the legislative. They bring about 
multiple veto gates where government policy proposals must pass, and they offer opposition 
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parties, opportunities to kill government initiatives or power to set their own agenda. To put 
it differently, a well-developed committee system in the legislature reduces the “policy 
influence differential,” so opposition parties can affect government policy to partially 
achieve their political goals (Strom 1984; 1990). 
The third factor that makes it uncertain to convert electoral victory into legislative power 
is weak party discipline. Backbenchers, who do not fear the retaliation of their leadership for 
their betrayal, often build a legislative coalition with opposition parties out of self-interest to 
frustrate the legislative victory of the incumbent party.  
In addition to these three factors, minority/coalition government improves the policy 
influence of opposition parties, which weakens the necessity to attain the incumbency in 
order to realize their policy. In terms of veto player, minority/coalition government creates 
the so called “partisan veto players” (Tsebellis 2002: 2). Participants in coalition 
governments and opposition parties in minority governments have the power to dissolve the 
government, and enjoy de facto veto power. In examining the institutional causes of 
independent central banks, Bernhard (1998) reasons and demonstrates that the political 
vulnerability of the leadership in coalition or minority governments along with information 
asymmetry that hinders a proper evaluation of the relationship between government policies 
and economic outcomes, leads to an independent central bank. The leadership in these 
governments cannot easily disregard the interests of their backbenchers, coalition partners, 
and even opposition parties, because they are unlikely to survive a serious opposition 
coalition. In other words, leaders in coalition and minority governments will take 
incremental and consensus-based approaches in making policies on controversial issues. This 
decision-making practice is likely to bring about a situation in which every party experiences 
a partial realization of its party policy goals regardless of the incumbency status. It weakens 
the incentive of parties, and in particular, of policy-seeking parties,
2
 to pursue vote in order 
to enter the government and realize theirs policies.
3
   
In sum, a combination of party discipline, legislative institutions, and minority/coalition 
government affects the degree of uncertainty in the conversion of votes into policy. The 
degree of uncertainty in the conversion process influences the decision of parties as to how 
                                                          
2 The difference between office-seeking and policy-seeking parties is found in the degree of party 
centralization reflecting the power relationship between the party leadership and activists. Party 
leaders who live off politics could be regarded as “electoral entrepreneurs.” We can assume that party 
leaders have a strong desire to retain or to come to office as their selective incentive. In contrast with 
party leaders, party activists as principled believers rather than careerists identify themselves with 
party ideology and weltanschauung (Panebianco 1988). Party activists tend to participate in a party to 
realize party causes and policies, which might be called collective incentive (Seyd and Whiteley 1992). 
If party leaders in “labor intensive parties” seriously rely on party activists to run the party, they 
cannot propose policies that disappoint the loyalists. Under these circumstances, we can expect that a 
party seeks policy goals rather than votes. Even though the degree of leadership autonomy could be 
expected to affect party behavior, the insufficient data does not allow me to do an empirical test in this 
article. In fact some data for party centralization are available from Kenneth Janda (1980), Political 
Parties: A Cross-national Survey. But the time period that he covers is from 1958-62, and only half of 
the countries in my study are surveyed. So I do not test the leadership autonomy hypothesis here. 
3 Powell and Whitten (1993) measure the index value composed of these factors (party discipline, 
bicameralism, committee system, minority/coalition government). I will use their data to test the 
second hypothesis. 





far they will deviate from their ideological lines. I call a composite index for party discipline, 
legislative institutions, and minority/coalition government post-electoral uncertainty in 
policy-making.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The more uncertain the conversion of votes into policy benefits, the 
more likely a party is to maintain its policy.   
 
It has been a conventional wisdom that electoral rules are a determinant of the types of 
party system. While proportional representation (PR) is likely to lead to the proliferation of 
parties, majority or plurality rule with single member districts often creates a strong two 
party system (Duverger 1954: 245-254; Stepan and Skach 1993: 17). Under plurality rule, 
parties are expected to adopt their policies to reflect median voters’ ideal points in order to 
win elections (Downs 1957: 123-125). Cox (1990) argues in his theoretical discussion on 
party position and electoral rules that a two-party system associated with plurality rule has a 
strong centripetal tendency in electoral competition.  
PR might also compel all parties to adopt the position of the median voter if there are few 
parties in electoral competition. But this is very rare in the real world (Cox 1990: 921). This 
means that party policy locations in PR tend to be dispersed rather than clustered around the 
center.  
It might be conceivable that PR allows the dispersed party locations to be relatively 
autonomous from the fluctuation of voters’ preference distribution because a small number 
of loyal voters, far less than a majority, might be enough for a party to wield political 
influence on government activity. In contrast to that, it might be the case that a marginal gain 
of vote changes everything in plurality. This speculation leads us to the hypothesis that a 
party is more likely to change its policy to mirror voters’ preferences under majority or 
plurality rule than under PR. 
 
Hypothesis 3: A party is more likely to attempt a marginal gain in votes by changing 
its policy under majority or plurality rule rather than under PR.  
  
In the following, I attempt to examine alternative hypotheses that might compete with the 
institutional hypotheses. The alternative ones include socio-economic factors that are often 
considered to affect political party behavior by experts. By its nature, a party as an 
intermediate political institution between the government and citizens, should aggregate and 
articulate social demands to be reflected in government policy. A party takes into account not 
only political institutions but also socio-economic parameters when they decide their 
electoral strategy. Therefore, it is important to look at the preference distribution of the 
electorate and its changes to understand parties’ strategic choices. This article looks at three 
socio-economic variables that are believed to mold voters’ preferences: social volatility, 
cleavage structure, and domestic economy.  
As society becomes volatile, it becomes more and more uncertain for a party to be able to 
depend on traditional partisan loyalists for electoral victory. A low rate of class voting, as a 
symptom of a volatile society, indicates that class-structural cleavages become weaker and 
weaker. In this situation it is expected that party ideology, which simplifies social conflicts 
and provides a clear outlook of the world, loses its electoral utility, and policy distances 
among parties get smaller and smaller. As a result of such a forceful social change, a mass 
party based on party activists is likely to be transformed into a catch-all party in order to 
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broaden its support (Kirchheimer 1966). Therefore, one can expect that in a country with a 
low class voting rate, party policies will become more flexible to attract voters who are free 
from class roots. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The lower the class voting rate, the more likely a party is to change its 
policy. 
 
Parties are in a sense the by-product of the birth or demise of social cleavage. According 
to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), party development goes along with the sequential eruption of 
new structural cleavages such as religion, region, and class. Cleavage structure in a country 
in a large part was determined by the timing of religious reform, nationalization, and 
industrialization. Owing to different sequential combinations among these important 
cleavages, in some countries, social cleavages are cumulative and lack a cross-cut structure, 
but other countries inherit blurred cleavage lines.  
The division between supporters and opponents on an issue is less clear in countries with 
cross-cut cleavages than cumulative ones. Cumulative cleavages, which deny multiple 
identities of individuals, create strong loyal supporters for a party that represents a cleavage 
line. Under horizontally isolated cleavages, parties have neither the incentive nor the ability 
to mobilize voters outside of their political territories. A party is unlikely to spend its 
resources on persuading voters that are beholden to opponents. Thus, party competition in a 
divisive society is likely to be “defensive” rather than “expansive” (Sani and Sartori 1983: 
331).  
 
Hypothesis 5: The more divisive social cleavages are, the more likely a party is to 
maintain its conventional programs. 
 
Keynesian economic prescription, that is, macroeconomic intervention in private 
economic affairs through fiscal and monetary policies, was aimed at the guarantee of 
economic stability and security, and earned a wide consensus in western democracies in the 
1950s and 1960s. After the global prosperity of the 1960s, not a few advanced Western 
democracies experienced the so called stagflation, and made serious efforts to find new 
alternatives. The recession in the world economy in the 1970s set off a vigorous economic 
policy debate in all the Western democracies, and in particular, in countries that were hit 
hard by economic downturns and severe global competition. Coleman (1997), examining the 
trends of congressional party conflict in the United States after 1945, demonstrates that the 
consensus of Keynesian economic management and its dissolution, together with political 
and structural contexts should be added to a political model in order to explain American 
party conflict. 
Each country responded to this global economic challenge differently, because of its 
different political and economic institutions and macroeconomic conditions. The small 
countries of Northern Europe for example, were less willing to resort to a pure market 
mechanism. In contrast, the United Kingdom and America chose to deregulate their 
economies. This difference led to quite contrasting macroeconomic outcomes. Ironically, 
countries that controlled the rate of inflation relatively well maintained a low degree of 
unemployment at the same time. As a result, the consensus on economic management was 
not much eroded in these countries. In the light of party policy, it might mean that parties in 





those countries are relatively less likely to search for new alternatives in economic 
management.  
 
Hypothesis 6: The harder the macroeconomic difficulties, the more likely are the 
parties in these countries to change their party policy. 
 
Lastly, I add the variable of vote difference between two consecutive elections to the 
statistical model. Intuitively, we could suspect that if a party loses votes in the previous 
election, it will change its policy in the following election. In electoral markets, a party 
should and will estimate its successes or failures in terms of the votes that it receives. In 
other words, as producers adjust prices of their products according to demand, so parties 
follow the outcome of voting. If a party’s policy is successful in electoral competition, that 
party will maintain it. If not, there is no reason to keep an unsuccessful policy.  
 




2. DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
 
2.1. Unit of Analysis 
 
The unit of analysis in this article is political parties in Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. The time period under the study is 
from 1960-90. I exclude parties that have never surpassed 10% of the total vote.
4
 But I do 
include parties that have participated in coalition government even though they do not pass 
the threshold because government participation means that the party has ‘coalition potential’ 
and can play a pivotal role in coalition formation (Sartori 1976: 122-123).  
 
2.2. Dependent Variables  
 
2.2.1. Party Policy Difference 
The Manifest Research Group (MRG) has developed a comprehensive content analysis of 
party election manifestos. In classifying party policy agendas into fifty-four categories of 
policy themes, it measures “percentages of the total number of sentences in the whole 
election program devoted to each of the fifty four thematic topics.” These data make it 
possible for us to estimate a party’s left-right positions over a considerable time period in 
industrialized democracies. I use the following method that Klingemann, Hofferbert, and 
Budge (1994: 37-40) design to calculate left-right scores:
5
  
                                                          
4 The parties excluded are green parties that were formed in the early 1980s and other extreme left and 
right parties. 
5 There are several alternative ways to locate parties on the left-right scale that help us to get cross-
national comparability, and for this purpose there are more reliable methods than the one that I use 
here, according to Gabel and Huber (2000). But it should be emphasized that what I measure here is 
not the left-right ideological positions of political parties but party policy changes from one point to 
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Left Orientation: Sum of percentages for 
(Decolonization + Anti-Military, Peace + Internationalism + Democracy + Regulate 
Capitalism + Economic Planing + Pro-Protectionism, Controlled Economy + Nationalization + 




Right Orientation: Sum of percentages for 
(Pro-Military + Freedom, Human Rights + Constitutionalism + Effective Authority + Free 
Enterprise + Economic Incentives + Anti-protectionism + Economic Orthodoxy + Anti-Social 
Services + National Way of Life + Tradition and Morality + Law and Order + Social 
Harmony) 
 
The dependent variables in this article are the absolute difference of left-right scores 
between two consecutive election periods (time Pt and Pt+1).  
 
Table 1: Average Party Policy Change in Industrialized Democracies 1960-1990 
 






































































Table 1 shows the extent of how party policies fluctuate at every election in each country. 
According to this table, the countries that record a low mean value of party policy change are 
France, Norway, and the United States. These three countries share few common 
characteristics as far as this article is concerned. An “electoral-professional” party that allows 
the party leadership to set up catch-all slogans to win an election, and two-party competition 
under plurality rule in the U.S. provide very favorable conditions for the realization of the 
median voter theorem. Contrary to these characteristics, Norway has a multiparty system, PR, 
                                                                                                                                                      
another. Therefore the method that I adopt in this article is suitable for my research goal.  





and frequent coalition government formation. Austria, Sweden, Ireland, Japan, and United 
Kingdom score a high mean value. But here we also cannot find any significantly common 
aspect to combine them all into a category.  
 
 
2.3. Independent Variables 
 
2.3.1. Vote Difference 
I calculate the vote difference between time Vt-1 and Vt, which is regressed on the 
dependent variables (the policy difference between time Pt and Pt+1). Electoral outcomes are 
taken from the third edition of The International Almanac of Electoral History (Mckie and 
Rose 1991).  
 
2.3.2. Coalition and Minority Government 
I adopt the scores that Bernhard (1998) presents. Using data from Woldendrop, Keman, 
and Budge (1993), he calculates the proportion of time a country was governed by a coalition 
or minority government from 1960 to 1990. In the case of the United States, he regards 
“divided government” as minority government.   
 
2.3.3. Post-electoral uncertainty in policy making 
I adopt the scores that Powell and Whitten (1993) present to measure the clarity index of 
government responsibility, consisting of party cohesion, committee system in the legislature, 
bicameralism, and minority/coalition government. High scores in the index mean that the 
central power is relatively dispersed. I use their scores to measure post-election uncertainty 
in policy making. 
 
2.3.4. Electoral Formula 
I use a dummy variable for PR to evaluate its effects on party behavior. PR is coded as 1, 
all others 0. Crepaz (1996: 93) argues that Japan and Ireland do not fit well into the 
dichotomy between PR and plurality. In spite of its formal features, the Japanese electoral 
system is often regarded as semi-proportional because of its proportional electoral outcomes. 
In the Irish PR system, limiting proportionality is attributed to a small district magnitude. But 
in this paper only formal features of electoral formula are considered. Therefore, Japan 
belongs to plurality and Ireland to PR. 
 
2.3.5. Social Volatility: Alford Index  
The Alford Index is calculated by subtracting the percentage of non-working class voters 
who cast a vote for a left party from the percentage of blue-collar workers who vote for a left 
party. The lower the Index value, the lower the rate of class voting. Bernhard (1998) reports 
that The World Values Survey provides the data for respondents’ occupation and their choice 
of parties in a hypothetical general election. He regresses Alford Index values calculated 
from The World Values Survey on Powell’s (1982) ones in Contemporary Democracies to 
check the reliability of his measure, and finds a significant correlation between the two data 
sets. I use the Alford Index data that Bernhard creates.  
 
2.3.6. Cleavage 
Combining several sources, Lijphart (1984: 43) classifies the countries under his study in 
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terms of the extent of pluralism and religious-linguistic homogeneity. Depending on his 
classification, I do ordinal scale measure on Cleavage. I give 4 to countries that have serious 
heterogeneity and pluralism: Belgium and Netherlands; 3 to Austria; 2.5 to Canada, 
Germany, and United States; 2 to Finland, France, and Italy; 0.5 to Australia; 0 to Denmark, 
Ireland, Japan, and New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
 
2.4. Economic Misery 
 
Crepaz (1996: 95) measures unemployment in 1965-1988, and inflation (1961-1988) in 
industrialized democracies. Cameron (1984: 144-149) also measures these economic 
indicators to appraise economic turbulence in western countries. The time period of 
Cameron’s data, however, does not fully cover the period that concerns this study. I will use 
Crepaz’s misery index that combines unemployment and inflation rates to measure 
macroeconomic difficulties.  
 



































































































































3. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Vote difference is statistically significant at 0.1 p value. The outcome shows that a party 
is more likely to change its policy after it loses votes than after it wins votes, thus confirming 
vote-seeking party behavior.  
According to Table 3, the frequent formation of a minority or coalition government also 
affects party behavior. The coefficient of the variable is significant at the p value 0.01, and 
the direction is negative as expected. The negative sign of the coefficient means that the 
frequent formation of a coalition/minority government discourages parties from gambling for  





Table 3: OLS Regression of political institutions and socio-economic  











Adjusted R Square 
F 
-0.155 (0.091)* 
8.271  (1.902)***       
-6.087 (2.198)*** 
-1.478 (0.707)** 






    *p < 0.1 




more votes by designing a new policy. The uncertainty index of policy-making, including 
coalition government, bicameralism, party cohesion, and legislative committee system, is 
also significantly associated with the choice of party strategy. The indefinite role of elections 
in the decision of who governs reduces the incentive for parties to change electoral platforms 
which might bring about a marginal gain of votes. These findings confirm that party behavior 
should be understood in the context of political institutions (Strom 1990).  
An unexpected finding here is that a party is more likely to change its policy under PR 
rather than under plurality rule. Before I discuss some reasons for this puzzling finding, 
given the fact that PR is significantly associated with multiparty systems, I look at whether 
the statistical significance between electoral formula and party policy difference still holds 
after party systems are considered. Party systems are measured in the way that Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979) propose.
6
 Then, I separate countries with party systems that have three or 
more parties from the rest. 
Table 5 shows that multiparty systems that consist of three or more parties in terms of 
Laakso and Taagepera’s index of “the effective number of parties” are also a factor that 
discourages frequent party policy change. One of the reasons that multiparty systems are 
important factors for party behavior is found from the fact that they are significantly 
associated with the other two political institutional variables such as coalition/minority 
                                                          
6 Laakso and Taagepera measure how many parties are in the party system by squaring each party’s 
share of seats, summing up all of these squares, and dividing 1 by this number. 
 
                                                                 Ns = 1/Σpi  
 
                                              Ns = the number of effective parties 
                                              Pi  = the fractional share of seats of the ith party 
 
The scores of the fractional share of seats are available from The International Almanac of 
Electoral History (Mackie and Rose 1991). 
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governments and post-election policy-making uncertainty.  
 



















































































     3.828 (1.150)*** 
   -3.686 (1.146)*** 
0.033 
    *p < 0.1 
 ** p < 0.05 
***p < 0.01 
 
 
The unexpected outcome of electoral formula still holds in spite of controlling for 
multiparty systems. To explain this puzzling finding, I suggest that we consider that plurality 
usually goes hand in hand with a small district magnitude and a large number of districts. 
This makes representatives vulnerable to local interests in their own constituencies, and 
results in widely divergent or even contradictory political preferences within a party. 
Therefore, unambiguously well-articulated party platforms might be disadvantageous for a 
party whose representatives cope with specific demographic and social issues, and might 
cause intra-party conflicts. Rather than causing oppositions by forming a clearly positioned 
national party platform, party leaders provide strategic room for their candidates who fight in 
districts by deliberately making a more or less ambiguous national party policy.  





In contrast, a large district magnitude and a small number of districts usually characterize 
PR countries. Because of their large constituencies, representatives are more autonomous 
from local interests (Rogowski 1987: 204). The larger the size of the constituency, the less is 
the electoral outcomes likely to be swayed by small interest groups. PR, and in particular list-
system PR, also has a significant implication for party organization. The list-system PR that 
every PR country in this study except Ireland enjoys gives the party leadership an important 
institutional instrument to control party affairs. The centralized appointment system of 
representatives helps strengthen party leadership autonomy. Given these reasons, it might be 
true that parties in PR are more willing and able to change party policy than parties in 
plurality.   
The social variables such as Cleavage, the Misery Index and the Alford Index turn out to 
be not significantly associated with party policy changes in these analyses. In fact, the 
measure of cleavage is significantly correlated with that of coalition/minority government. 
To check the possibility that cleavage is insignificant because of multicollearity, I run a 
regression without the latter variable. But the outcome is still the same.  
A further point is worth mentioning with respect to social cleavages. Suppose that 
divisive social cleavages are not significantly connected with parties appealing to 
particularistic demands such as ethnic, religious, linguistic, territorial issues. In this case, 
social cleavages would be unlikely to deter mass parties or catch-all parties from making an 
aggressive mobilization effort. Otherwise, parties might avoid an asymmetric vote trade-off 
for fear that their more embracing policies would disappoint their traditional supporters and 
fail to catch new ones (Prezworski and Sprague 1986: 74). A proper estimate of the impact of 
social cleavages on party policy change might be made by considering the structure of party 
competition. 
Some points also should be taken into account with respect to macroeconomic difficulties. 
The welfare state formula is proposed and supported mainly by social democratic parties. 
Therefore, it might be conceivable that a turbulent economy has a significant impact only on 
left parties and not on right parties.  
  
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This cross-national study attempts to run a preliminary statistical test of hypotheses of 
institutional determinants for party policy change in electoral competition. The first two 
hypotheses examine whether uncertainty in the conversion of votes into policy and office 
benefits affects party policy change. The third one concerns the relationship between 
electoral rule and party policy change.  
My analysis confirms the first two hypotheses. When minority and coalition governments 
appear frequently, parties have little tendency to change their party policy. In other words, 
party policy change has an inverse relationship with uncertainty in the conversion of votes 
into office benefits. The expected inverse relationship between party policy change and 
uncertainty in the conversion of votes into policy benefits is also confirmed. The 
combination of party indiscipline, bicameralism, legislative committee system, and minority 
and coalition government that make the policy advantage of incumbent parties insecure 
encourages parties to maintain their party platform in electoral competition. When votes do 
not play a decisive role in government formation and policy output after election, parties tend 
to maintain their ideological lines. My analysis also implies that the greater the certainty that 
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votes will be accurately converted into policy and office benefits, the more value parties will 
place on the pursuit of votes.   
This study of the determinants of party policy change demonstrates that an institutional 
explanation for party behavior is empirically supported. Political institutions that distort the 
transformation of the vote into government formation and policy output significantly 
diminish the marginal utility of the vote. Examples here are minority/coalition governments, 
party discipline, committee system in the legislative, bicameralism, and multi-party systems. 
Since marginal vote gains have a very limited political utility for ambitious party leaders 
under these institutional circumstances, a party is not willing to undertake a policy 
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